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The Prisoner’s Dilemma, Martin Peterson (ed.). Cambridge University Press, 2015, viii + 298 pages. 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a collection of discussions by philosophers and economists on the most-
debated example from game theory. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (henceforth ‘PD’) is also the prime 
example for game theory’s ability to fuel debates about rationality that have captivated many 
researchers interested in how agents think, or should think, in interactive situations. 
For an illustration of the PD structure, an example of a (one-shot, two player) PD game is depicted in 
figure [1], in which numbers represent utilities. Players I and II choose between two strategies, 
“Cooperate” and “Defect”. For both players defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation no 
matter what the opponent does. It follows that no player can gain by unilaterally changing her 
strategy only if both defect: (Defect, Defect) is the only Nash equilibrium of the PD. However, in 
equilibrium, the payoffs for both players are smaller (in the example, 1 for both) than what they 
would have received had both played the dominated, cooperative strategy (2). 
What makes the game a “dilemma” is this discrepancy between what may be interpreted as 
individually rational acts and the socially undesirable outcome they constitute. The PD structure 
raises questions about the concept of rationality, cooperation, the interpretation of game theory, 
and its relation to real-world interactions and behaviour. 
In section 1 of this review, I give a brief summary of the book and propose a way of thinking about 
its themes. In section 2, I focus on the dispute about whether it can be rational to cooperate in a 
one-shot PD. Ken Binmore defends the orthodox view that it is irrational to do so in chapter 1. By 
contrast, in chapter 2, David Gauthier argues it can be rational. I shall argue that Gauthier’s view is 
internally inconsistent. Thus, if one reads Gauthier’s chapter as a challenge to Binmore, it is, if I am 
right, a failed challenge. 
  
Figure 1: example of a PD game. Player I’s payoff is shown on the bottom left and player II’s payoff on the top right of 
each cell. The best responses for the players are marked with squares around the payoff numbers. (Defect, Defect) is an 
equilibrium in pure strategies (in fact, it is the only equilibrium). 
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1. Overview and thematic organization. 
 
The book’s structure is somewhat haphazard, and one need not read its fourteen chapters in the 
order in which they are presented. To help the reader, I propose organising them into the following 
five themes. 
(1.) Rational play in the PD. The first theme is whether cooperation can be rational in one-shot PDs. 
As we have seen, cooperating in such games means playing a dominated strategy instead of playing 
the equilibrium strategy prescribed by classical game theory – an irrational move, according to the 
orthodox analysis. Binmore defends the orthodox view. In contrast, Gauthier, Martin Peterson, and 
Giacomo Bonnano all agree – albeit for different reasons – that it can (although it may not always) 
be rational to cooperate in such a game. 
Gauthier takes Pareto efficiency instead of utility maximisation as the primary goal of a theory of 
practical rationality. For him, it is a reductio of the orthodox analysis that defection which leaves 
every player worse off is the prescribed strategy of non-cooperative game theory. Even worse, in his 
view, is the orthodox theory’s prescription, using backwards induction, to always defect in finitely 
repeated PDs with fixed, commonly known endpoints. 
Bonnano analyses counterfactual reasoning in one-shot PDs. According to him, a player’s beliefs that 
her opponents will cooperate, conditional on the cooperation of the player herself, can serve as an 
argument to rationalise the cooperation strategy. 
Peterson argues we should model a player as an aggregate of subagents with different aims that play 
“internal” games against each other, and that “external” games a player plays against other players 
can be described as being part of internal games. Since subagents will likely encounter each other 
again in future games of similar structure, this allows modelling external, one-shot PDs as internal, 
indefinitely repeated PDs. According to Peterson, this may serve as an argument for cooperation in 
one-shot PDs. 
(2.) Conditions for cooperation. The second theme looks at the conditions under which cooperation 
can evolve, or become a rational strategy (assuming that it is not a rational strategy in the first place 
– in this respect, the theorists in this group seem to agree with Binmore and disagree with the 
authors discussed above). 
Paul Weirich argues that individual rationality of the members of a group constitutes the group’s 
collective rationality. What the PD shows is that collective rationality does not imply efficiency or 
maximising collective utility: suboptimal outcomes in PD-like situations are deficiencies but are 
‘excused’ (p. 270) by the PD structure. 
The chapters of Jeffrey Barrett and of Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso focus on 
communication as enabling cooperation. Barrett discusses cooperation in an evolutionary setting 
with pre-play signalling. Bicchieri and Sontuoso build on Bicchieri’s work on social norms: 
communication enables agents to focus on social norms, which if complied with, are mutually 
beneficial. These norms may then guide agents’ choices of strategy and, in particular, may lead them 
to cooperate. They also summarise empirical evidence confirming the hypothesised positive 
correlation between communication and cooperation. 
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(3.) Incentives in PDs. Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Brooks investigate players’ incentives relative 
to the total number of players, in both PDs and Public Goods games. It is generally claimed that the 
incentives to defect in one-shot PDs increase with the number of players. Brennan and Brooks agree, 
other things being equal, but argue that external effects not occurring in the framing of a problem as 
a PD – such as the number of observers of players’ choices – may even work in the opposite 
direction. 
Charles Holt, Cathleen Johnson and David Schmidtz present new empirical results on how agents 
play in finitely repeated PDs with commonly known endpoints. Cooperation increases with the 
length of the game, and when the interaction between the players is voluntary, i.e. there is an exit 
option to playing the game. These findings may serve as policy advice on how to promote 
cooperation. 
(4.) Applications and applicability. Anna Alexandrova and Robert Northcott challenge the 
explanatory role of the PD and with it that of game theory more generally. They claim that attempts 
such as Axelrod's (1984) to force the occurrence of historical events (e.g., World War I truces) into a 
game theoretic straitjacket (an indefinitely repeated PD) fail in comparison to historical 
explanations. Moreover, they claim that very few real-world phenomena even have a PD structure. 
The next two essays implicitly contradict these claims, modelling social phenomena as PDs or game 
theoretically more generally. Douglas MacLean argues that the global problem which anthropogenic 
climate change poses is a (one-shot, because future generations cannot reciprocate) PD: a country’s 
reducing emissions (“cooperating”) is dominated by sticking to the status quo (“defecting”) because 
it would have economic disadvantages and the effects for the global climate of unilaterally reducing 
emissions are small. What makes the enforcement of cooperation difficult is that failing to reduce 
emissions will affect mainly future generations. There is widespread agreement that there should be 
discount rates to the costs of future damages and future emission reductions. However, the size of 
the discount rates is a central controversy that has received special attention since the release of the 
Stern Review (Stern 2007). MacLean sides with Stern that the discount rates should be relatively 
small. 
Luc Bovens argues that classical tragedies of the commons, as they are presented in Aristotle, Hume 
and Mahanarayan, have the structure of a “voting game” rather than a PD. A voting game, in 
Bovens’ terminology, is an n-player noncooperative game with payoffs that are made up of a simple, 
monotonic coalitional form game where joining a coalition (meaning cooperating, or casting a vote) 
is costly. It follows that only players in minimal winning coalitions have incentives to do so. The 
equilibria of such a game are “all defect” and mixed equilibria where a minimal coalition forms and 
all players outside the minimal coalition defect. The instability of the mixed equilibria may then 
explain the likely outcome in Tragedy-of-the-Commons-like situations: the suboptimal “all defect” 
equilibrium. 
(5.) Framing/modelling. The applications and applicability theme is intimately connected with the 
problem of how to model specific games or social structures. José Luis Bermúdez asks whether the 
PD can be modelled as Newcomb’s problem, as was argued by David Lewis in his defence of causal 
decision theory (Lewis 1979). Bermúdez thinks it cannot. He argues that Lewis commits the same 
fallacy as can be found in the symmetry argument in favour of cooperating in a one-shot PD. The 
symmetry argument is this: in a symmetric game with common knowledge of rationality among the 
players, only symmetric choices are possible and hence cooperation is the only rational strategy. The 
argument fails because it effectively changes the structure of the game – the resulting game is no 
longer a one-shot PD. 
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Daniel Hausman discusses the question of how social situations should be modelled. Many situations 
which may from the outside appear to have the structure of PDs are not conceived as PDs by 
players. For example, in many PD experiments, the payoff numbers are monetary payoffs, but the 
players involved in the game may add secondary utilities for cooperative behaviour. They may 
appear to be playing a dominated strategy when really they aren’t. According to Hausman, the 
problem of mapping specific situations to game forms is a central worry for game theory, and more 
work should be dedicated to it. 
 
2. Is cooperation rational in a PD? 
 
The dispute between Gauthier and Binmore merits more attention. Gauthier sketches a theory 
which advances Pareto efficiency as the decisive criterion for a rational solution to a game, as 
opposed to the equilibrium criterion which orthodox game theory prescribes. He claims that his 
theory rationalises cooperation in one-shot PDs and finitely repeated PDs with fixed, commonly 
known endpoints. 
It is instructive to contrast Gauthier’s with different views on rationality. Gauthier calls theories of 
rationality that rely on the equilibrium concept best reply theories because a combination of 
strategies in which each player’s action is a best reply to the other players’ actions constitutes an 
equilibrium. According to Binmore’s best reply theory, all and only equilibrium strategies (i.e. 
strategies that are played with positive probability in some equilibrium) are rational. Games may 
have many equilibria. A stronger best reply theory than Binmore’s is one according to which playing 
an equilibrium strategy is necessary but not sufficient for rationality. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) 
championed this approach with a general theory that selects a uniquely rational equilibrium for 
every game. 
In contrast, according to Gauthier, playing an equilibrium strategy is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for rational play. Consider again the PD in figure [1]. Gauthier thinks the only equilibrium (Defect, 
Defect) cannot be the solution a theory of rationality should prescribe. Two cooperators playing the 
PD manage to interact in a way that makes both better off than two defectors. What is necessary for 
rational play is Pareto efficiency, whenever the opponent is likely to cooperate too. If he doesn’t, it is 
rational to fall back on best reply reasoning and defect instead of falling prey to his play. In short, 
Gauthier seeks to rationalise cooperation in a potentially cooperative environment. 
I will argue that Gauthier does not succeed in rationalising cooperation. In a nutshell, my argument is 
the following. Gauthier’s theory – although put forward as a general theory of “practical rationality” 
– seems to be primarily motivated by the aim of justifying cooperation in the PD. It yields rather 
absurd recipes for rational behaviour when applied to game structures different from the PD, even 
for (and perhaps particularly for) theorists sympathetic to cooperation in the PD. To the extent that 
Gauthier’s theory fails as a general theory of rationality, it fails as a theory for prescribing rational 
behaviour in the PD. 
The problem is that his theory which he claims is opposed to best reply theories is really married to 
best reply theories, and that the marriage is not a happy one. To begin with, note that Pareto 
efficiency is a weak concept and in many games entirely indecisive. For example, in zero sum games, 
every possible strategy combination is Pareto efficient. To put teeth into his theory, Gauthier bases it 
on best reply theories: he requires choosing a Pareto efficient equilibrium if one exists; and 
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otherwise an outcome that Pareto dominates all equilibria (p. 41). But this recipe yields results that 
conflict with his view, as the next example shows. 
Consider an example of the Chicken Game, depicted in figure [2]. The game has three equilibria: the 
pure equilibria (Straight, Swerve) and (Swerve, Straight), and a mixed equilibrium in which both 
players play swerve with probability 9/10 and straight with probability 1/10. In the pure equilibria 
the players receive a payoff of (1, -1) and (-1, 1) respectively. In the mixed equilibrium, both players 
receive payoff -1/10. The pure equilibria are Pareto efficient whereas the mixed equilibrium is 
dominated by (Swerve, Swerve) which gives both players payoff 0. Hence, applying Gauthier’s 
recipe, only the pure equilibria are candidates for rational play. I argue that this is a self-defeating 
outcome for two reasons. 
First, it is an outcome that rocks the cooperator’s boat. Both pure equilibria leave one of the players 
in negative figures, and seem precisely to violate cooperators’ willingness to find a mutually 
advantageous outcome. Consider, in contrast, the non-equilibrium compromise (Swerve, Swerve) in 
which both players receive 0 payoff. This mutually advantageous outcome has recently been 
suggested by theorists defending the rationality of non-equilibrium play (Karpus and Radzvilas 2016). 
It has a “cooperative spirit” which the pure strategy equilibria lack. As described above, this 
“cooperative spirit” is the very motivation for Gauthier’s theory; yet the theory is unable to choose 
the outcome that realises it. The theory’s aim and its realisation are thus in conflict. 
The claim that (Swerve, Swerve) in the Chicken Game has a “cooperative spirit” can be made more 
precise. Suppose we transform the game in figure [2] into a cooperative game. In such games, 
players can reach Pareto efficient outcomes which are not in equilibrium through binding 
agreements. So in the Cooperative Chicken Game, all three Pareto efficient outcomes (Swerve, 
Swerve), (Swerve, Straight), and (Straight, Swerve) can be reached. Which one will be reached? 
According to Nash (1953), the selection of the cooperative outcome can be seen as the solution to a 
bargaining game. If the players have equal bargaining power, the outcome in our game is precisely 
(Swerve, Swerve). 
 
 
Figure 2: example of a Chicken Game. There are three equilibria: two pure equilibria indicated in the figure; and a mixed 
equilibrium in which both players play swerve with probability 9/10 and straight with probability 1/10. 
Second, Gauthier’s theory does not only rely on best reply theories; it relies on a best reply theory 
that selects a unique equilibrium. Moreover, whenever there are Pareto efficient equilibria among 
the equilibria in the game, the best reply theory must select one among them (p. 41). According to 
Gauthier, this Pareto efficient equilibrium is the unique rational outcome of the game. 
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Gauthier does not describe what this best reply theory should look like, and in fact this would be an 
impossible task. Consider the example of the Chicken Game again. Once the Pareto-dominated 
mixed equilibrium is eliminated, there remain two Pareto efficient equilibria. However, given the 
symmetries of the game, there are no rational grounds on which to distinguish between the two 
equilibria. Hence, no theory of rationality could distinguish between them. For this reason, Harsanyi 
and Selten’s (1988) theory – which always selects a unique equilibrium – selects the mixed 
equilibrium in this game. 
Harsanyi and Selten’s theory can be criticised on the grounds that it may select Pareto-dominated 
equilibria. They cannot be criticised for inconsistency. Binmore’s theory can be criticised on the 
grounds that it deems all equilibria – Pareto efficient or not – equally rational. But he, likewise, 
cannot be criticised for inconsistency. Gauthier demands that a theory of rationality select a unique, 
Pareto efficient equilibrium whenever there are Pareto efficient equilibria. This demand is 
impossible to meet, and so refutes his theory. Note that my argument does not preclude the 
possibility of there being a consistent theory of rationality which implies cooperation in the PD. 
Gauthier’s, however, is not such a theory. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
I can recommend the present volume to researchers and students interested in the foundations of 
game theory and its applications. It is also well-suited to be read in a graduate semester course on 
the PD. It could be read cover-to-cover, or following the thematic organisation I proposed in section 
1. As the discussion in section 2 indicates, the volume comprises lively discussions of at times 
opposing views. One can hope that these original and up-to-date contributions will stimulate further 
foundational research in game theory, the philosophy of its application, and the philosophy of 
rationality. 
 
Philippe van Basshuysen* 
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